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THE SUPREME COURT- LEADING CASES

359

the governance of a massive administrative undertaking is at stake,
open discussion of the individual focus or group orientation of one's
opinions may help prevent an innocuous choice of words from triggering a real-world anomaly.

C. Civil Rights Acts
1. Civil Rights Act of 1991 -Employer Liability for Punitive Damages in Title VII Claims. -The Civil Rights Act of 19911 ("the 1991
Act") expanded the remedies available for violations of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 2 ("Title Vll") to deter intentional discrimination more effectively. 3 The 1991 Act subjected employers who are
found guilty of intentional employment discrimination to compensatory and possible punitive damages in addition to the equitable relief
already available under Title VII. 4 Last Term, in Kolstad v. American
Dental Ass'n, 5 the Supreme Court determined the circumstances under
which a court may award punitive damages under Title Vll. The
Court ruled that to obtain punitive damages a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant acted with malice or reckless indifference to
her federally protected rights, rather than with egregiousness, the
higher standard imposed by the District of Columbia Circuit. This
holding accurately interpreted Congress's intended standard for punitive damages. The Court went on to state, however, that employers
will not be vicariously liable for punitive damages when the discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents are made contrary
to the employer's "good-faith efforts to comply with Title Vll."6 Yet
the ·Court did not define what constitutes such efforts. 7 By allowing
to change "the behavior of a whole society'~; Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical
Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1191-93 (1986) (asserting a tension between "policing" of individual infractions and "associational forms of regulation," which require sustained involvement
in group activities); cf }AMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 7 (1938) (describing the rise in "administrative process" as a result of "the growing interdependence of individuals
in our civilization"); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative
Process, 98 COLUM. L . REv. 1, 12-25 (1998) (arguing that the "regulatory state" is a response to
problems of collective action).
1 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections of

42

u.s.c. (1994»·

2 42 U.S.C. §§ 20ooe-2oooe-17 (1994).
See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pl 1, at 14 (1991). The 1991 Act also made punitive damages
available for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ I2IOI-I22I3 (1994).
4 See Civil Rights Act of 1991,42 U.S.C. § 198ra (1994).
s 119 S. Ct. 2118 (1999).
6 /d. at 2129 (quoting Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(Tate),]., dissenting)).
7 See E .E.O.C. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Nos. 98-2015, 98-2030, 1999 WL 638210, AT •6 (1oth
Cir. 1999) ("Kolstad provides us no definitive standard for determining what constitutes goodfaith compliance."). In Wal-Mart, the Tenth Circuit applied the Kolstad ruling to a case involving
3
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employers to avoid' punitive liability for their agents' unlawful behavior without establishing a clear good-faith-effort standard, the Court
rendered Title Vll's most powerful deterrent mechanism - punitive
damages - ineffectual.
Carole Kolstad served as the Director of Federal Agency Relations
in the Washington, D.C. office of the American Dental Association
(ADA). 8 Tom Spangler was the Legislative Counsel in the same office.9 In September 1992, Jack O'Donnell announced that he was retiring both as Director of Legislation and Legislative Policy and as Director of the Council on Government Affairs and Federal Dental
Services, the second-highest position in their office. 10 In the fall, both
Kolstad and Spangler formally applied for 0 'Donnell's position. 11
Both had worked directly with O'Donnell and had received "distinguished" performance ratings. 12 In December 1992, the ADA notified
Kolstad that it had chosen Spangler as O'Donnell's replacement. 13
Kolstad brought an action under Title Vll in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that in selecting
Spangler to succeed O'Donnell, the ADA had intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of sex. 14 The jury found in Kolstad's
favor and awarded her $52,718 in damages, which represented the additional pay that she would have received had she been chosen to replace O'Donnell. 15 The jury did not consider awarding Kolstad punitive damages because the judge had not instructed it on the issue. 16
Kolstad moved for ·additional equitable relief in the form of instatement to 0 'Donnell's position with the ADA. 17 The court denied this

punitive damages for a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1210112213 (1994).
8 See Kolstad, 139 F.3d at 960.
9 See id.
10 See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 108 F.3d 1431, 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
11 See id.
12 See id.
13 See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 912 F. Supp. 13-14 (1996).
14 See id. Kolstad based her claim of unlawful discrimination on an assertion of disparate
treatment, which is significant because only disparate treatment claims are eligible for punitive
damage awards. See 42 U.S.C. § 198Ja (1994). A plaintiff claiming disparate treatment must
show the following: that the plaintiff is a woman, that the plaintiff was refused a position for
which she applied and was qualified, and that the employer filled the position with a man. See
Kolstad, 108 F.3d at 1436. After a plaintiff has made this prima facie case, the burden shifts to
the employer-defendant to rebut the plaintiff's claim with evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision. See id. If this burden is satisfied, then the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to prove that the defendant-employer's reasons were pretexts for unlawful discrimination. See id.; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 4II U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (stating the
elements necessary to prove racial discrimination).
15 See Kolstad, 912 F. Supp at 14.
16 See id.
17 See id.
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motion because, despite the jury verdict, the court did not believe that
Kolstad had actually proved unlawful sex discrimination. 18
Both parties appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. 19 The court of appeals held that the district court had erred in not instructing the jury on punitive damages. 20
The ADA argued that Congress intended only for . plaintiffs in "extraordinarily egregious cases" to recover punitive damages. 21 Writing
for the Court, Judge Tatel rejected the ADA's argument and endorsed
Kolstad's argument that the standard of proof for punitive damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a is the same as the standard under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981 and 1983. 22 Judge Williams dissented from the finding on punitive damages, arguing that the minimum standard of evidence for
punitive damages should be higher than the standard.{or liability. 23
The District of Columbia Circuit granted an en bane rehearing on
the punitive damages issue, and the court adopted Judge Williams's
position, 24 holding that a plaintiff could be awarded punitive damages
only upon a showing of egregious behavior. 25 Finding that Kolstad did
not demonstrate that her employer acted egregiously, the court affirmed the district court's refusal to instruct the jury on punitive dam-

18 See id. at 15-16. The ADA had moved to overturn the jury verdict as a matter of law, but
the court denied the motion. See id. at 13. The court found that the verdict could not be overturned because under Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1995), a jury's decision to
infer unlawful discrimination solely based on a belief that the defendant-employer's explanations
are simply pretextual is appropriate and cannot be overturned. See Kolstad, 912 F. Supp. at 15.
19 Kolstad appealed the district court's decision not to instruct the jury on punitive damages,
and the ADA appealed the district court's denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law.
See Kolstad, 108 F.3d at 1434.
20

See id.

21

I d. at 1437 (internal quotation marks omitted).

22

See id. at 1437-38. Punitive damages are awarded under section 1981 if the plaintiff proves

that the defendant acted with evil motive or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to the
rights of the plaintiff. See id. Section 1981a's language tracks the standard of proof requirements
for punitive damages under other civil rights statutes, including sections 1981 and 1983, and the
court decided that if Congress had wanted courts to depart from the "well-established legal standards" for punitive damages, then it would have made that intent clear. I d. at 1437.
23 See id. at 1440 (Williams, J ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Based on the common law analog of intentional discrimination- intentional torts- Judge Williams argued that
punitive damages should be allowed only when the plaintiff has proven that the defendant acted
with "a state of mind more extreme than what is required for the intentional tort on which the
punitive claim is piggybacked." I d. at 1441-42.
24 See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958, 960 (D.C. CrR. 1998). Judge Williams
wrote for the court, and Judges Silberman, Ginsburg, Sentelle, Henderson, and Randolph joined
the opinion. In determining the standard for punitive damages under '42 U.S.C. § 1981a, the
court was guided by the belief that the 1991 Act created a "two-tiered scheme of liability," in
which punitive damages were not to be automatically available to all Title vn plaintiffs. Id. at
961-62. The court read the 1991 Act's legislative history as indicating that Congress "intended to
establish an egregiousness requirement for punitive damages." I d. at 965.
25 See id. at 969.
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ages.2 6 Judge Tatel dissented, 27 arguing that because section I98Ia
does not mention egregiousness, applying such a standard would conflict with the reckless indifference requirement of sections I 98 I and
I983. 28 Judge Tatel maintained that because it was the court's duty to
give effect "to every clause and word of [t~e] statute," the court could
not ignore the reckless indifference standard or undermine it by
adopting an egregiousness standard. 29
The Supreme Court reversed the District of Columbia Circuit's decision and held that a plaintiff does not have to demonstrate egregious
conduct to obtain punitive damages. 30 Writing for the Court,31 Justice
O'Connor determined that Congress intended to impose two standards
of liability on employers found liable for intentional discrimination:
one for compensatory damages and another, higher standard for punitive damages. 32 The Court held that section 1981a's required showing
of "malice" or "reckless[ness]" stated the requisite higher standard for
punitive damages.33
Having rejected the District of Columbia Circuit's egregiousness
standard, the majority proceeded to address an issue that the parties
did not raise: "the proper legal standards for imputing liability to an
employer in the punitive damages context."34 The Court concluded
that employers cannot be vicariously liable for punitive damages for
the discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents when
See id.
Chief Judge Edwards and Judges Wald, Rogers, and Garland joined Judge Tatel's dissent.
28 See Kolstad, I39 F.3d at 97 I (Tate!,]., dissenting).
29 /d. (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. I54, I73 (I997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Judge Tate! also argued that the majority opinion failed to provide district courts with adequate
guidance as to what constitutes egregiousness. See id. at 976-78.
30 See Kolstad, I I9 S. Ct. at 2I24, 2126.
3l Part I of Justice O'Connor's opinion was unanimous. Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Part IT-A of Justice O'Connor's opinion, and Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined Part IT-B. Part IT-A considered the
evidentiary standard necessary for obtaining punitive damages and Part 11-B discussed the conditions under which employers can be vicariously liable for punitive damages.
32 See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2I24.
33 /d. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § I98Ia(b)(I) (I994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The I99I
Act's innovation was that it enabled plaintiffs to obtain punitive damages on the condition that
the defendant-employer acted with malice or reckless indifference to the federally protected rights
of the plaintiff. See 42 U.S.C. § I98Ia(bXI). The "malice" and "reckless indifference" standards
refer to the employer's knowledge that it may be acting in violation of Title vn, not that it may
be engaging in discriminatory behavior. See id. The Court raised this distinction and noted that
there are circumstances under which intentional discrimination does not give rise to punitive
damages because the employer is unaware that the discrimination is unlawful. See Kolstad, 119
S.Ct.at2I25 .
. 34 Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2127 . Justice O'Connor stated that this "issue is intimately bound up
with the preceding discussion on the evidentiary showing necessary to qualify for a punitive
award, and it is easily subsumed within the question on which we granted certiorari . . .. " /d. at
2I27.
26

27
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those decisions are contrary to the employer's "good-faith efforts to
comply with Title VII."35 The Court applied modified agency principles to its analysis of employer liability for punitive damages. The
Court first examined traditional agency principles, which allow a principal to be held vicariously liable for the actions of its agent when the
agent "was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the
scope of employment."36 The Court observed that acting in the "scope
of employment" can include intentional torts involving conduct that
the employee "is employed to perform, that occur substantially within
the authorized time and space limits, and is actuated, at least in part,
by a purpose to serve the employer."37 The Court reasoned that these
broad guidelines would cause an employer who "makes every effort to
comply with Title VII" to be held liable for the discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents. 38
The Court found that this outcome, however, was in tension with
both the purposes of Title VII and the principles underlying common
law limitations on vicarious liability for punitive damages 39 because it
would "reduce the incentive for employers to implement antidiscrimination programs," a result directly contrary to the "purposes underlying Title VII."40 The Court based this conclusion on its belief that Title VII was "designed to encourage the creation of antiharassment
policies and effective grievance mechanisms."41 The Court argued that
holding all employers vicariously liable for punitive damages for the
discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents would have
a chilling effect on the implementation of antidiscrimination programs
and policies. The Court reasoned that the existence of an antidiscrimination program would lead a court to believe that the employer
was aware of Title VII's requirements. Therefore, any violation of Title VII would automatically constitute acting with malice or reckless
indifference to the federally protected rights of the plaintiff, thus satisfying the standard for punitive liability. Under this reasoning, employers would have a disincentive to implement antidiscrimination
programs because it could lead to automatic liability. 42
3 5 ld. at 2129 (quoting Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 139 F.Jd 958, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(Tate!,]., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
36 /d. at 2128 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 217C (1958)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
37 /d. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(1) (1958)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

38 /d.

See id. at 2128-29.
/d.
41 /d. (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Cl 2257, 2270 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
42 See id.
39
40

HeinOnline -- 113 Harv. L. Rev. 363 1999-2000

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented from
the Court's rejection of the egregiousness requirement, arguing that
such a requirement is implied in Congress's two-tiered scheme for
monetary relief. 43 The Chief Justice concurred, however, in the
Court's application of modified agency principles to limit an employer's vicarious liability for punitive damages. 44
Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part. 45 He concurred in the Court's decision to reject an egregiousness requirement
for punitive damages. 46 Finding that the vicarious liability issue was
not properly before the Court, Justice Stevens dissented from the
Court's holding regarding that issue. 47 Justice Stevens argued that the
vicarious liability issue was not properly before the Court because the
facts of the case did not present that issue and the parties had not
briefed it. 48 Furthermore, Justice Stevens argued that the agency issue
was not applicable to this case. 49 Promotion decisions are "quintessential company acts," he argued, and therefore there is no need to use
agency principles to impute the promotion decision to the employer. 50
Given the plain language of the 1991 Act and Congress's intent, the
Court's primary holding - that plaintiffs need not demonstrate egregiousness to obtain punitive damages- is correct. 51 The Court's decision that certain employers cannot be vicariously liable for punitive
damages, however, is mistaken. The Court stated that the primary objective of Title VII is to prevent unlawful discrimination 52 and that
this purpose is adequately advanced when employers are encouraged
to adopt antidiscrimination policies. 53 The Court's holding, however,
assumed that employer antidiscrimination policies are the only means
of preventing discrimination. According to this view, if punitive liability threatens these preventive measures - as the Court insisted it
does - then punitive liability cannot be extended because it would
leave no way to prevent unlawful discrimination. Yet both Title VII
and the 1991 Act deliberately rely on alternative preventative measSee id. at 2130 (Rehnquist, C.]., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id.
45 Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
46 See Kolstad, II9 S. Ct. at 2130 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
47 See id.
48 See id. at 2133 .
49 See id.
so Id. (quoting Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1998)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
51 Although Congress intended the standard for punitive damages to be higher than the standard for ordinary liability, Congress clearly meant the higher standard to be malice or reckless
indifference, as stated in the language of section 198ta(b)(r). See id. at 2124; H.R REP. No. I0240, pt. I, at 72 (1991); supra note 14 (describing the standard for ordinary liability).
52 See Kolstad, II9 S. Ct. at 2129.
53 See id.
43
44
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ures. Congress recognized, in 1964 and again in 1991, that remedial
procedures can serve as effective deterrent mechanisms for preventing
unlawful discrimination. 54
In 1991, Congress believed that punitive damages would serve as a
more effective deterrent for unlawful discrimination than the existing
equitable remedies. 55 Congressional findings indicated that the available equitable remedies were "not adequate to deter unlawful discrimination. "56 In an attempt to effectuate the deterrent purpose of
Title VII, Congress made compensatory and punitive damages available to victims of unlawful discrimination under the 1991 Act.57 Congress believed that liability for monetary relief was critical for realizing
the deterrent purpose of Title VII, reasoning that if discrimination is
expensive, people will stop engaging in discriminatory behavior. 58
Allowing employers to escape vicarious punitive liability undermines the deterrent effect that imposing punitive liability was
intended to have under the 1991 Act. 59 Because individuals are
generally not personally liable for punitive damages and employer vicarious liability for punitive damages has been limited by Kolstad, few
people will be deterred by the threat of punitive damages. 60 Although
there are other mechanisms that encourage adherence to Title
VII, the pre-1991 deterrent mechanisms have dearly not been
successful from Congress's perspective. 61
In deciding the vicarious liability question, the Kolstad Court examined the effect of such liability on employers' adoption of antidiscrimination policies. The Court thus focused its inquiry too narrowly;
it should have examined the effect of vicarious liability on the broader
deterrent purpose of Title VII and the 1991 Act. The deterrent purpose of these laws extends beyond encouraging employers to adopt antidiscrimination policies to preventing employers from engaging in
unlawful discrimination. Had the Court examined the effect of vicari54 See Civil Rights Act of I964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2oooe-2oooe-I7 (I994); Civil Rights Act of I99I,
42 U.S.C. § I9Sia (I994).
55 Compensatory and punitive damages were already available in I99I for intentional discrimination based on race but were not available for discrimination based on religion or sex. See
H.R. REP. NO. I02-40, pt. I, at 65 .
5 6 I d. at IS.
57 See 42 U.S.C. § I9Sia (I994).
58 See H.R. REP. No. I02-40, pt. I, at 69.
59 The deterrent effect of punitive damages is similar to the deterrent effect of general punishment. When individuals understand that they may become subject to a particular punishment
- for example, punitive damages - for taking a certain action, fear of punishment will generally
deter them from that action. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 450 (6th ed. I990).
60 See Michael D. Moberly & Linda H. Miles, The Impact of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 on
Individual Title VII Liability, IS OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 475, 49o-92 (I993).
61 See H.R. REP. No. I02-40, pt. I, at IS ("[E]xisting [civil rights] protections and remedies are
not adequate to deter unlawful discrimination.").
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ous liability on the prevention of unlawful discrimination - the
broader purpose of Title Vll - it would have seen that holding employers vicariously liable for punitive damages would not have undermined, but instead would have furthered, the deterrent purposes of Title vn and the 1991 Act. Potential liability for punitive damages
would encourage employers to take the steps necessary to adhere to Title Vll. Limiting the potential for punitive liability leaves employers
with the pre-1991 incentives to adhere to Title vn - the incentives
that Congress deemed inadequate.
Although the Court did not define what constitutes a good-faith effort to comply, the resulting standard is likely too low to gauge adequately an employer's attempt to comply with Title Vll. Law firms
advising employers about the Kolstad ruling have stated: "As an employer, you can breathe a bit easier -you don't have to worry quite
as much about large punitive damage awards if you've adopted and
implemented antidiscrimination policies."62 The employment law
newsletters also state, however, that making a good-faith effort under
Kolstad requires, at a minimum, having antidiscrimination policies in
place that are regularly and consistently used. 63 In Equal Employment
Opportunities Commission v. Wal-Mart Stores, 64 the Tenth Circuit recently applied the Kolstad ruling and measured the defendantemployer's good-faith effort by the existence of an antidiscrimination
policy. 65 The Tenth Circuit held that although the defendant-employer
had a generalized policy of equality, it had not educated its employees
on the requirements of the federal law involved and therefore its general policy did not constitute a good-faith effort to comply. 66 Unfortunately this decision did not provide more guidance as to what constitutes a good-faith effort because the facts did not even meet the
minimum requirements. 67 As is evident in the advice from the employment law newsletters and the holding in Wal-Mart Stores, employers will only be concerned with having regularly and consistently used
antidiscrimination policies and employee education regarding the ap-

62

High Court Ends Tel"m with Important Rulings on ADA, Punitive Damages, PA.

EMPLOYMENT L. LETTER (Buchanan Ingersoll), July 1999, at 4 [HEREINAFTER, High Court,

Pa.]; accord High Court Ends Tel"m with Important Rulings on ADA, Punitive Damages, N .H.
EMPLOYMENT L . LETTER (Sulloway & Hollis), August 1999, at 6 [HEREINAFTER, High Court,
N.H.]. These law firms also stated, however, that employers could not turn a blind eye to employee actions once the policies were in place; rather, it would be necessary for employers to ensure that their policies were being applied. See High Court, Pa. at 4; High Court, N.H. at 6.
63 See High Court, Pa. at 4i High Court, N.H. at 6.
64 No. 98-2015, 98-2030, 1999 WL 638210 (roth Cir. 1999).
65 See id. at •7.
66 See id.
67 The defendant did not meet the minimum requirement of personnel education regarding
federal rights.
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plicable federal laws, and will not be as interested in taking the necessary action to ensure that their employees do not unlawfully discriminate.
By focusing on the existence of antidiscrimination policies as evidence of an employer's good-faith effort to comply with Title Vll, the
Court has chosen an unreliable indicator. Modern employment discrimination is generally covert, 68 and antidiscrimination policies may
not be indicative of an employer's effort to comply with Title Vll.
The employment law newsletters' insistence that the policies are regularly and consistently used is an attempt to address this concern, yet
such policies do not gauge important subtle factors that affect an employer's compliance efforts. Subtle factors include supervisors' revealing their attitudes about the seriousness of discrimination matters
through verbal and non-verbal innuendoes, employees noticing that
filed complaints are never positively resolved, and the reactions of supervisors and management to individuals that use the policies. Because these factors would be difficult to document when attempting to
rebut an employer's claim that its regularly and consistently used antidiscrimination policies represent a good-faith effort to comply, it would
be hard to determine an employer's true effort to comply with Title

vn.

The Court based its decision on the idea that the best way to induce compliance with Title vn is to provide employers with positive
incentives. This opinion conflicts with Congress's decision that the
best way to induce Title Vll compliance is by providing a negative incentive- punishment- to those who engage in intentional discrimination.69 The difference in the two liability regimes is the amount of
effort that employers will make to comply with Title Vll by preventing
unlawful discrimination. Under the regime the Court established in
Kolstad, employers will be interested in establishing antidiscrimination
policies with two components: a component indicating that it is not
company policy to discriminate against individuals on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; and a component detailing
a procedure for addressing claims of discrimination. Alternatively, if
the Court had allowed employers to be vicariously liable for punitive
damages, then employers would institute antidiscrimination policies
that actively ensure compliance with Title Vll and ensure that em-

68 See David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment:
The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1644 (1991) (discussing the covert nature of
employment discrimination); Marina C. Szteinbok, Note, Indirect Proof of Discriminatory Motive
in Title VII Disparate 1Yeatment Claims After Aikens, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1114, 1114, 1116
(1988) (same).
69 See H .R. REP. No. 102-40, pl 1, at 69-70.
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ployers seriously address potential violations. 70 By making punitive
damages available to victims of intentional employment discrimination, Congress intended to do more than to ask employers to try to
comply with Title vn - it intended to punish them if they failed to
comply.
If the Court was interested in providing a positive incentive for Title Vll compliance without undermining the deterrent effect of punitive damages, it could have adopted a rule similar to the rule adopted
in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth 11 and Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton 12 governing employer liability for a supervisor's sexual harassment. Employers would be vicariously liable for punitive damages
subject to an affirmative defense, enabling employers who exercise
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly discriminatory behavior to escape vicarious liability for punitive damages. 73 The Kolstad rule presumably places the burden of proving that an employer
did not make a good-faith effort on the plaintiff. If employers bear the
burden of proving reasonable care or a good-faith effort to avoid otherwise automatic punitive liability, employers would have a stronger
incentive to take the actions necessary to prevent unlawful discrimination in their workplaces. The incentive would be stronger because
employers would face the more difficult task of proving that they took
reasonable care or made a good-faith effort to comply, rather than escaping liability because the plaintiff could not prove that the discriminatory behavior did not comport with the employer's good-faith effort.
Both Title Vll and the 1991 Act were enacted to prevent unlawful
discrimination and each used different types of deterrent mechanisms.
Had the Kolstad Court appreciated the broader purpose of both laws,
it would have seen that holding employers vicariously liable for punitive damages would not have undermined the purpose of Title VII. In
fact, the Court would have concluded that it was only by holding employers vicariously liable for punitive damages that courts could spur
employers to work tirelessly to prevent unlawful discrimination in
their workplaces.
2.
Title IX - School District Liability for Student-on-Student
Sexual Harassment. - Enacted to eliminate gender discrimination in
70 Cf H.R REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 70 (implying that employers take active measures to prevent employment discrimination only when there is "increased liability").
71 II8 s. Ct. 2257 (1998).
72 II8 s. Ct. 2275 (1998).
73 In Burlington Industries and Faragher the Court decided that employers would be vicariously liable for a supervisor's sexual harassment unless they demonstrated two things: first, that
the employer "exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior"; and second, "that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise."
Burlington Indus., u8 S. Ct. at 2270; accord Faragher, u8 S. Ct. at 2292-93.
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